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UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, Appellant, .,.. 
UNION SUGAR COMPANY (a Corporation), Respon-: 
dent. 
[1] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-In Aid of Interpretation-Bur-
rounding Oircumstances. - Where a supplemental contract 
amending an oil and gas lease is uncertain on its face with' 
respect to a clause providing that after a designated inter-
mission the lessee would be obligated to drill a certain number 
of wells each year, evidence of the negotiations of the partiea 
and of the surrounding circumstances is admissible for the 
purpose of determining the meaning of the lease as modified b)" 
such clause. (Code Civ. Proc., I§ 1856, 1860.) 
[2] OU-Leases-ActioDll-Evidence.-In an action for declaratory-
relief with respect to a supplemental contract amending an oil 
and gas lease, the evidence did not support a finding that the 
drilling obligations of the lease were not modified by the sup' 
plemental contract, where it appeared from letters exchanged, 
between plaintiff's assignor and defendant that the partiea, 
agreed that the lessee would be obligated to drill a certain num-, 
[l]See ., OaLJur. 294; 20 Am.Jur. 9~ 
McK. Die. BeferenC8S: [1] Evidence, § 41l; [2, 3] Oil, 137(1);, 
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ber of wells each year regardless of the price of oil, that this 
obligation was in lieu of the drilling requirements of the orig-
inal lease, and that the lessee agreed to pay advance royalties 
and to increase his drilling operations in regara to offset wells. 
[Sa. Sb] Id.-Leases-Actions - Evidence. - In an action for de-
claratory relief with respect to a supplemental contract amend-
ing an oil and gas lease, where an inference that the parties did 
pot intend to create a new contract could only be drawn if the 
letters between them showing an intent to relieve the lessee of 
the original obligation were disregarded, and where the trial 
court specifically found that such letters were mailed and re-
ceived, the evidence was not reasonably susceptible of an infer-
ence in defendant's favor that would support the conclusion 
that the original lease was not modified by the supplemental 
contract. _ / . \ ; 
[4] Appeal-PresUJDptions-Findings.-The rule thtain the ab-
sence of findings of fact and conclusions of law ery intend-
ment is in favor of the judgment appealed from, d that it is 
presumed that every fact or inference essentiai"to the support 
of the judgment and warranted by the evidence was found by 
the court, is inapplicable where the court made specific findings 
which were inconsistent with inferences in support of the judg-
ment. 
[6] OU-Leases--Oonstruction.-In an action for declaratory re-
lief with respect to a supplemental contract amending an oil 
and gas lease, the rule that in cases of uncertainty the lan-
guage of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against 
the party .who caullCd the uncertainty to exist and that the 
promisor is presumed to be such party (Civ. Code, § 1654), 
could not support a judgment for defendant lessor, where a 
basic issue in the case was who was the promisor, and where, 
moreover, the evidence showed that the modification was sug-
gested by the president of defendant company in language that 
was copied almost verbatim into the formal document. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Barbara County. Ernest D. Wagner, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for declaratory relief with respect to a supplemental 
contract amending an oil and gas lease. Judgment for defen-
dant reversed. 
L. A. Gibbons, Jerry H. Powell, Douglas C. Gregg, Brobeck, 
Phleger & Harrison, MaUl1ce E. Harrison and Moses Lasky 
for Appellant. 
Cross & Brandt and Arthur H: Brandt for RespondenL 
) 
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TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought this action for Qe~IIara." 
tory relief to obtain a determination of its drilling oblligllti(lul 
under an oil and gas lease as modified by a sUI>pllem4mtlll IlIlUee-JI 
ment between the parties. Plaintiff appeals 
entered in favor of defendant, Union Sugar UOlnplmy 
The original leaSe was executed in 1936 between U""''''', .. a..u1oi1tl 
Union Sugar Company, as lessor, and Sovereign Oil Cnll"1Vl.1'a.;~ 
tion, as lessee. E. H. Moore, Incorporated, a one-man corpo-
ration, hereinafter referred to as Moore, succeeded to the 
rights of the lessee. Subsequently, plaintiff acquired the lease 
from Moore. The original lease gave the Jessee the right 
extract oil and gas from a tract of land containing aplPl'O,Xl·'j 
mately 6,700 acres for 20 years and for as long 1,1J~'r.,.1..I. 
hydrocarbon substances were produced from the land. , 
lessee agreed to pay the lessor a royalty of one-eighth of tli.e 
proceeds from the sale of the oil and gas. Paragraph 7 of 
the lease provided that after the discovery of oil and gas in' 
paying quantities, the lessee would continue to drill additional 
wells until it had drilled one well for each 10 acres held under . 
the lease. It also specified the rate of drilling required of the 
lessee: 
"After the discovery of oil or gas in paying quantities on 
the demised premises, Lessee agrees to continuously operate .. 
one string of tools with due diligence for the first year after 
such discovery, two strings of tools for the second year after 
such discovery, three strings of tools for the third year after 
such discovery, four strings of tools for the fourth year after 
such discovery, and five strings of tools thereafter until the . 
drilling requirements herein specified are complied with. 
Lessee may defer the commencement of the next well to be I 
commenced with each string of tools to be operated hereunder :' 
for a period of not to exceed thr~e months after the comple- ', 
tion of the well next preceding the well drilled with that 
particular string of tools. The lessee shall be entitled to drill 
as many additional wells on said land and premises 88 it 
desires." 
The original lease contains three clauses suspending the 
drilling requirements of paragraph 7. Paragraph 7, in addi-
tion to its other provisions, provides: 
"Drilling and producing operations hereunder may also 
be suspended while the value of oil of the quality produced 
from said land, as defined in paragraph One hereof is Sixty 
Cents or less per barrel at the well, :.r when there is no avail-
able market for the same at the well at such price." 
-
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Pllragraph 10 of the lease contains a force majeure clause 
providing that the drilling requirements shall be suspended 
whenever the lessee is prevented from complying with the 
Jease because of strikes, lockouts, actions of the elements, acci-
dents, rules and regulations of any federal, state, municipal 
or other governmental agency, or because of other matters or 
conditions beyond the lessee's control. 
Paragraph 33 provides that the lessee may suspend drilling 
operations if it is obligated to curtail production by reason of 
any valid order, rule, law or regulation of any federal, state 
or other governmental subdivision and such curtailment makes 
it impossible for the lessee to produce oil at a profit. 
Two other provisions of the original lease are pertinent. 
Paragraph 9 of the original lease provides that the lessee 
agrees to drill offset wells whenever a well on adjoining prop-
erty within 250 feet of the limits of the land contained within 
the lease is producing oil or gas in paying quantities. Para-
graph 25 of the original lease provides that the lessee may 
surrender all or any part of the acreage and thus reduce the 
number of wells to drill. 
Soon after the lease was executed, the Pacific Coast Rail-
way Company, which owned a strip of land extending across 
part of the leased premises, became a party to the lease. This 
company was named as a defendant in the present action, but 
permitted its default to be entered and is not a party to this 
appeal. 
In September, 1939, the price of oil produced at the wells 
on the leased premises dropped below 60 cents a barrel, and 
Moore, who was then the lessee, suspended drilling operations 
in accord with the provisions of paragraph 7. By this time, 
the lessee had spent over a million dollars in drilling 12 wells, 
two of which were dry, three wholly unprofitable, and the 
rest of moderate production. In October, the price of oil of 
the quality produced by these wells was from 45 to 46 cents a 
barrel at the wells. In that month Moore and the Union Sugar 
Company commenced negotiations for a modification of the 
lease. In 1940, the defendant Union Sugar Company entered 
into a formal agreement with Moore. The agreement was en-
titled "Supplemental Contract" and was executed as of 
February 1, 1940, by defendant, Pacific Coast Railway Corpo-
ration, and Moore. By the terms of this agreement the parties 
agreed that the original lease "be and the same is hereby. 
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"(1) All obligations to drill additional wells, except 
wells, are hereby suspended for a period of two years 
February 1, 1940. 
"(2) At the expiration of said two year period, 
shall be obligated to complete three wells per year. 
"(3) Numerical paragrapb (9) of the lease of April 
1936, [with respect to off-set wells] shall be modified by 
ing out 4250 feet' wherever the same appears therein, and 
serting in lieu thereof' 330 feet.' 
44 (4) Commencing from the date of this supplemental 
tract, Moore agrees to pay a minimum royalty of ;P""".VVV.VVl 
per year, payable monthly in advance, and said royalty 
be charged against the total oil reserves during the course 
the life of the lease; that is to say, Moore shall be entitled 
all oil and/or gas produced from said lease, or the proceed.l 
thereof, until it is fully reimbursed from lessors' one-eighth 
royalty interest for the minimum royalty so paid. ~: 
" (5) Except insofar as the provisions of the lease of April 
8, 1936, are in conflict herewith, the same shall remain in full 
force and effect. " 
In 1940, plaintiff acquired the rights of Moore as lessee. On 
June 22, 1942, defendant served on plaintiff a notice of defanl~ 
reciting that plaintiff was not operating two strings of tools I 
on the leased property and was therefore not complying witi( 
the terms and conditions of paragraph 7 of the original lease, : 
since the price of oil was then over 60 cents a barrel. The notice, 
also recited that if this failure continued for 90 days after the·i
l
· 
date of the notice, the lease would terminate and the lessee'., 
rights to drill additional wells would be forfeited. A contro-, 
versy having arisen concerning the extent to which the sup-' 
plemental contract modified the drilling obligations of para-
graph, 7 of the original lease, this action was brought. Plain-
tiff alleged that clause 2 of the "Supplemental Contract" 
modified paragraph 7 so that the lessee after February 1, 1942 
is only obligated to drill three wells a year regardless of the 
price of oil. 
When the ease first came on for trial the court sustained 
defendant's objection to the introduction of any extrinsic evi-
dence with reference to the negotiations and circumstances sur-
rounding the execution of the supplemental agreement. The 
complaint was amended, and when the ease came on for trial 
the second time defendant's objection to the introduction of 
this evidence was overruled and the evidence was admitted. 
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paragraph 7 were not modified by the •• Supplemental Contract 
so as to obligate plaintiff only to complete three wells each 
year in lieu of the continuous operation of any specified num-
ber of strings of tools. It Accordingly, the trial court concluded 
that the plaintiff, after February 1, 1942, and during the re-
mainder of the terms of said lease, is bound by the drilling 
requirements of paragraph 7 of the original lease, and con-
strued the modification clause as binding the plaintiff, "after 
February 1, 1942 . . . to complete in any event at least three 
wells each year on the premises described in said lease." 
(Italics added.) 
This requirement, however, was held subject to the provi-
sions of paragraph 10 of the original lease and "plaintiff is 
not required to perform the same if and while plaintiff is pre-
vented from complying therewith in whole or in part by rea-
sons of strikes, lockouts, action of the elements, accidents, rules 
and regulations of any Federal, State, Municipal or other gov-
ernmental agency or other matters or conditions beyond the 
control of the plaintiff." 
From a judgment for defendant entered in accord with this 
conclusion, the plaintiff appeals, on the ground that the trial 
court erroneously construed the "Supplemental Contract" as 
not modifying the drilling requirements of paragraph 7 of the 
original lease. [1] The:first question presented by this ap-
peal is whether the trial court acted properly in admitting 
evidence of negotiations between the parties as an aid to the 
interpretation of the supplemental contract. Both parties con-
tend that apart from these negotiations the contract is sus-
ceptible of only one interpretation. They disagree, however, 
as to what that interpretation should be. Defendant contends 
that the trial court's interpretation must be sustained because 
the supplemental contract on its face provides that" All obli-
gations to drill additional wells . . . are hereby suspended for 
a period of two years from February 1, 1940. . .. At the expi-
ration of said two year period, Moore shall be obligated to 
complete [in any event at least] three wells per year." Plain-
tiff contends that the provision in question is clear on its face 
and reasonably susceptible of only one construction, namely 
.. At the expiration of said two year period, Moore shall be 
obligated to complete [only] three wells per year. It The basis 
of plaintiff's contention is that since the provision contains the 
word «. obligated," it was intended to measure the obligation of 
the lessee and thus replaces the. drilling requirements of para-
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and the "Supplemental Contract" makes it clear that they' 
cannot be construed together without reading words into, 
clause 2 of the latter instrument.;, 
Once something has to be read into a contract to make it' 
clear, it can hardly be said to be susceptible of only one inter-: 
pretation. It would have been error for the trial court to read. 
something into the contract by straining "to find a clear mean~ 
ing in an ambiguous document, and having done so exclude the 
extrinsic evidence on the ground that as so construed no am~: 
biguity exists." (Body-StefJlIer Co. v. Flotill Products, 63 
Cal.App.2d 555, 562 [147 P.2d 84].) Moreover, the Construc-
tion advanced by the defendant would not support the decision 
of the trial court. Merely reading the words "in any event" 
into the clause in question was not sufficient to clarify the 
meaning of the lease as modified, for the trial court held that· 
plaintiff was not obligated to drill wells in any event. Para-' 
graph 7 was not the only provision of the original lease pro-
viding for a suspension of drilling requirements. The trial; 
court held that plaintiff's obligation to drill was subject to 
suspension in the event of strikes, accidents and other condi-. 
tions specified in the provisions of paragraph 10 of the original 
lease but such obligation to drill would not be suspended by 
reason of the conditions specified in paragraph 33. This con-
struction, if based only on the express wording of clause 2 of 
the "Supplemental Contract," would be unreasonable, for it 
would require the court to read the clause as if it provided that I 
"Moore shall be obligated to drill three wells per year [under . 
all circumstances except those provided in paragraph 10 of the 
original lease but not including the provisions of paragraphs : 
7 and 33 thereof]." \ 
It is thus apparent that the contract is not clear on its face, 
and under the theory of the parol evidence rule that has been 
accepted by the majority of this court, l evidence of the negotia-l 
tions of the parties and of surrounding circumstances was I 
admissible for the purpose of determining the meaning of the 
'The view hal been expressed that the requirement of ambiguity 
involved in the admission of extrinsic evidence "simply means that 
the language used by the parties must be susceptible to the meaning 
claimed to have been intended by the parties." (Dissenting opinion in 
E.tate of ]lUle, 25 Cal.2d 1, 22 [152 P.2d 1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319).) Under 
this theory, extrinsic evidence is generally admissible to show the sense 
iB which the parties used language embodied in the contract, whether or 
IIOt the words appear ambiguous to the reader. (See concurring opinion 
iB U"wer.al Sales Corp. v. California etc. Mfg. Co., 20 Ca1.2d 751, 776 
[128 P.2d 665); Rest. Contracts, § 242, comment a; Holmes, The Theo", 
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lease as modified by clause 2 of the" Supplemental Contract." 
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1856, 1860; Universal Sales Corp. v. Cali-
fornia etc. Mfg. Co., 20 Ca1.2d 751, 761 {128 P.2d 665] ; Wachs 
v. Wachs, 11 Ca1.2d 322, 326 [79P.2d 1085] ; Balfour v. Fresno 
Canal & Irrigation Co., 109 Cal. 221, 223 [41 P. 876] ; Wein-
stein v. Moers, 207 Cal. 534, 540 [279 P. 444] ; McNeny v. 
7'ouchstone, 7 Cal.2d 429, 433 [60 P.2d 986] ; Body-Steffner 
Co. v. Flotill Products, supra, 63 Cal.App.2d 555, 561; Mc-
Daine, California Evidence Manual, §§ 408,409.) 
This conclusion does not run counter to the provision of the 
"Supplemental Contract" that "Except insofar as the provi-
sions of the lease of April 8, 1936, are in conflict herewith, the 
same shall remain in full force and effect." It is clear that 
before this general provision can be applied, the meaning of 
the specific provisions of the agreement must first be ascer-
tained in order to determine the extent to which they conflict 
with the original lease. 
[2] The question remains whether the trial court's con-
clusion as to the meaning of clause 2 of the supplemental con-
tract can be affirmed on the basis of the extrinsic evidence. 
This evidence consisted of various letters between the repre-
sentatives of the parties to the modification agreement and 
testimony with reference to a conference, during the course of 
negotiations, between Moore's representative and the presi-
dent and two directors of defendant corporation. The evidence 
with reference to the letters is not in conflict. The trial court 
made specific findings as to what occurred at the conference 
and found that the letters were properly mailed and received. 
In October, 1939, Mr. Villard Martin, Moore's attorney, en-
tered into negotiations with Mr. T. A. Twitchell, attorney for 
defendant, for the purpose of modifying the original lease. 
The evidence regarding these negotiations and the tentative 
plan agreed upon by the two representatives is contained in 
a letter written on October 14, 1939, by Mr. Twitchell addressed 
to Mr. Edmunds Lyman, then president of defendant corpo-
ration, for the purpose of having Mr. Lyman submit the pro-
posed plan to defendant's board of directors. The letter stated 
that "Mr. Moore desires to construct a topping plant to handle 
the oil from the lease, but does not desire to spend the money 
required to build this plant if he has to comply with the exist-
(3d ed.) U 2458-2478; MeBaine, The RuZe .Against DiBturb'ng Plain 
Meaning of Writing8, 31 Cal.L.Rev. 145.) In view of the fact that the 
instrument involved in this ease is not free from ambiguity, it is unnee-
e~sary to consider the applieability of this intel'prctation of the extrinsic 
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ing drilling requirements of the lease." The plan tentativelj. 
agreed upon by the two attorneys is outlined in the letter .. 
follows: . !. 
cc 1. The Union Sugar Company shall agree to suspend all 
drilling obligations for a period of two years, except the obli' 
gation to drill offset wells. At first glance, this may appear to 
be too much of a concession, but on the other hand, at the. 
present price of oil, Moore is not obligated to drill. Based 
upon my conversations with operators in the field, I do noi. 
believe that the price of this grade of oil is going above 60_' 
per barrel within the next two years. Of course, ~o one can'. 
foresee the future market conditions, and if oil should go tC:, 
60¢ or more per barrel, the Company would lose the royalty"l 
on the allowable production from the wells which Moorewoulcr 
be required to drill if the lease was not modified. To offset·. 
this, the Company would begin to receive royalty from the 
lease immediately if the lease is modified and Moore constructS: 
a topping plant. ': 
"2. The existing proven area, comprising some 400 acr~' 
would be zoned and in that zone, after two years, Moore would 
be required to drill 3 wells per year, provided that the priCe. 
of oil is 60, or more per barrel at the well, excepting when the ' 
following circumstances existed: •.• [at this point the letter. 
contains further limitations on the requirement of drilling 
three wells a year which are not material to the ease since they 
are not covered in the contract.] 
., The provision ealling for three wells per year was inserted 
because three wells per year would be all that Moore would be 
required to drill, assuming that he was operating with one I 
string of tools. Martin said he might desire to drill three wells : 
all at one time under contract rather than to allow 90 days to ' 
elapse between wells, as provided in the lease. 
"3. Moore should not be obligated to drill any addition81 
wells on any part of the leased property outside of the proven \' 
area, unless oil should be discovered in the property or adja. 
eent property at such locations that it would appear probable; 
dlat oil could be discovered and produced from a portion of 
die unproven area." "\ 
. This plan was rejected by defendant's board of directors. , 
fte negotiations leading to it are important, however, for: 
tIIey indicate that at that time Moore was interested in build· ' 
iDg a refinery; that he wished to be relieved of drilling obliga-
tions for two years; and that thereafter he was to drill only 
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The letter is also relevant to show the connection between the 
requirement of paragraph 7 of the original lease that the 
lessee operate a certain number of strings of tools and the re-
quirement of clause 2 that the lessee drill three wells since one 
string of tools will ordinarily drill one well a month. In view 
of the 90-day interval between the completion of one well and 
the beginning of another provided for in the original lease, 
one string of tools would apparently drill about three wells 
each year. 
After entering into the foregoing negotiations with Mr. 
Twitchell, Moore's attorney returned to Tulsa, Oklahoma. The 
trial court found that, "in December 1939 [Mr. Martin] again 
went to California; that upon his return to California he had a 
conference with Roland E. Tognazzini, Francis L. Cross and 
Fred Cooke respecting a possible modification of said Original 
Lease; that said Roland E. Tognazzini was then President and 
said Francis L. Cross and said Fred Cooke were then directors 
of the defendant UNION SUGAR CoMPANY; That during said 
conference said Villard Martin stated to said Roland E. Tog-
nazzini that said E. H. MOORE, bro. considered the drilling 
requirementS' of said lease of April 8, 1936, as prohibitive and 
desired some relief therefrom and that said E. H. MOORE, INO. 
desired to have said drilling requirements modified so as to 
provide for a complete suspension of drilling operations for 
two years. 
"That it is true that said Roland E. Tognazzini stated to 
Villard Martin that defendant UNION SUGAR COMPANY 'had a 
situation where the Company beeauseof a posted price of oil 
being less than 60¢ which was the figure in this particular 
lease stood not to receive revenue for a great many years to 
come' and that if said E. H. MOORE, IN"o. desired relief upon 
the drilling requirements of said Lease it would be necessary 
for them to pay an adequate consideration for it. 
C C That it is true that said Villard :Martin returned to Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, and on January 11, 1940 wrote and sent to said 
Roland E. Tognazzini and said Roland E. Tognazzini in due 
course received the letter dated January 11, 1940 .•.. " This 
letter repeated substantially the plan that had been submitted 
to defendant in Twitchell's letter of October 14, 1939.2 By 
"With reipect to the modification of drilling requirements of the leue 
Mr. Martin '. letter of January 11, 1940, eontained the follOwing pro-
POW: 
, • All obligation to drill additional wells, except ofraet wella, are hereb:r 
tuspended for a period of two years from the date of this contract. 
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a letter dated January 16, 1940, and addressed to M 
defendant's president, Tognazzini, again rejected this p', 
posal and made a counteroirer. This letter reads as folloWa 
"In response to yours of the 11th, may I first advise 
the terms and conditions contained therein are unsatisfacto 
"It was my impression from past conversations you 
with my predecessor, and more recently, with Messrs. Coo 
Cross, and me that it was the desire of E. H. Moore, Inc. . 
obtain a modification of the present oil and gas lease e . .. 
between E. H. Moore, Inc., and the Union Sugar Company 
In this connection, I expressed to you at our recept meetiDI 
that Union Sugar Company was desirous of cooperating wi , 
E. H. Moore, Inc., but only to the extent that both pam " 
were to benefit mutually by said modification. 
"I gathered definitely that the main desire for a modifi 
tion on your part was to .liminate what lIOU consider aft· 
onerous drillmg clawe. 1ft '1Ms connection 1 stated that we, 
would be willing to modify ,aid drillmg clause after due and 
proper consideration wer" gitlm 'herefor. 
It As 1 see the problem, it reHlfHI itself dcntm to a tier';, 
simple one, to-wit: your autr. 's lie released of the pres",' 
drilling clause and .6 pe""'tlM '0 dn1l after a two year 1tU~1 
p",sion of all dn1.ling requirement" three wells per year. W,} 
on the other hand, desire to obtaift a minimum royalty throug~, 
ottt the duration of the 'ease. In view of the fact that the: 
present lease ties up some 6,700 acres and further, in view' 
of the fact that E. H. Moore, Inc., has arbitrarily determined 
that 400 acres are proven, in spite of the fact that it is the. 
consensus of opinion that considerably more acreage is oil 
bearing, it necessarily follows that to determine a minimum 
royalty based upon the unit plan as you have indicated in: 
yours of the 11th, cannot logically follow. ' 
------------------------------------------------, c1ril1 three wells per year in any area consisting of approximate];' 400 
acres, being that part of the leased prelDises which is considered proven 
territory and identi1ied by a plat attached hereto as Exhibit A, provided 
that the priee of oil is smy cents per barrel, or more, at the well, exeept 
that Moore shall not be obligated to drill during the existence of either 
.1 the following conditions: , 
II <a> If Moore is unable to market oil to be produeed from II8icl 
pr'!F:,rty; . 
, <b) If operators in the teld are unable to market 100 barrels, or 
more, ~ clay from wells capable of producing 1500 barrels, or more, per 
day, and Moore would be uDable to market 100 barrels, or more, per cla;y 
from any well to be drilled by it on said property; 
"(e) If Moore is unable to market any oil in addition to the quantity 
fIf oil produeed from wella already drilled by Moore while said wella are 
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"Both you and I, in obtaining a modification, desire to 
reduce it to its simplest form and to this extent I suggest the 
following, to-wit: 
"(1) the suspension of aU obligation to drill additional 
wells, except offset wells, for a period of two years from date 
of the modification, . 
"(2) the modifying of the paragraph 9, by striking out 
250 feet and inserting in lieu thereof 330 feet, and in addi-
tion thereto, appropriate language to provide that when offset 
wens are being produced within said range, more or lesa, 
E. H. Moore, Inc. likewise produce, 
"(3) at the expiration of the two year period, E.H. Moore, 
Inc. shall be obligated to driU three wells per year. 
"The consideration for the above will be the paying of a 
minimum royalty of $25,000 per year, said royalty payable 
monthly in advance." (Italics added.) 
It is notable that the wording of clause (1) of this proposal 
is almost identicaJ with paragraph (I) of the modification 
agreement and that there is no substantial difference between 
the wording of clause 3 of the proposal and par-agraph (2) of 
the agreement. (See McNeny v. Touchstone, 7 (:la1.2d 429, 
435 [60 P.2d 986].) ) 
The proposal contained in the foreg~t'tir was even-
tua]]y accepted by Moore but not without further negotiations. 
Moore replied to Tognazzini's letter on January 25, 1940, 
stating that clauses (1) and (2) were acceptable but that 
"there should be some conditions attached [to clause (3)] that 
would provide for an exemption from drilling obligations 
under certain possible market conditions and the price of 
oil." Moore also stated that the consideration asked by Tog-
nazzini was not satisfactory, and Moore offered to pay $1,000 
a month minimum advance royalty beginning February 1, 
1940. . 
In a letter dated January 27,1940, Tognazzini rejected this 
counteroffer and again offered the terms contained in his 
letter of January 16, 1940. He stated in his January 27th 
letter: 
"It has been the policy of this company to cooperate to the 
fullest with its lessees, whomsoever, and it shan continue that 
policy in the future. In this particular case you have asked 
for concessions which in the final analysis operate exclusively 
unilaterally in your behalf. 
"Because of your past financial performance on our prop-
erty and the anticipated future performaneea in the aame 
/ 
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connection, we have been willing to entertain such a ULl.UGI.eCII 
arrangement solely because of our desire to be cooperative .. 
entertaining BUch a modification, we have asked only 
nominal sum of $25,000 per year, payable monthly in aa1t1a,~. 
Said consideration is really not a consideration,. but 
payment, monthly in advance, of a minimum royalty 
presently known oil reserves; said royalty to be ehlllrQ'j""'J 
against the total oil reserves during the course of the life 
the lease. So in effect any modification of this lease . 
strictly to your added and new benefit and wit1t.out any 
ienefit to us. 
"You infer that the modification might commence 
February 1st. In this connection may I advise that the mo:nthl1J 
meeting of the Board of Directors is to be held W., ........ ~,'.AGJ 
January 31st at 1 :30 p. m. If you desire that I obtain 
the Board at such meeting a ratification of the proposed 
fication, as contained in mine of January 16th, please -_.,._ .• 
me on or before said date. If that be your desire, it wt"U be II 
rimple matter to draw up a modification as heretofore ouf~ 
"ned, the language pertaining thereto to be satisfactory I, 
both parties." (Italics added.) ". 
This offer was accepted by Moore in a letter dated Janlll&t'Y 
29, 1940. Moore wrote: 
"Replying to your favor of the 27th inst., 1 beg to ad-
vise that 1 have decided to accept your proposition and pay 
you an advance royalty equalling $25,000.00 per year, pay-
able monthly in advance, beginning with the month of Feb-
ruary. 1 am therefore enclosing herewith check for $2,083.33 
being the first monthly payment on the proposed modification 
that you will submit to your Board of Directors on the 31st.'~ 
The letter continued with reference to matters not perti-
nent to this case. Moore concluded the letter as follows: 
"I will request Mr. Martin to prepare a modification of 
the lease embodying the principles contained in our corre-
spondence, and forward it to you within the next day or I 
two. 1 would do it at this writing, but Mr. Martin is occu- I 
pied DOW in the trial of a lawsuit that may cause a little 
delay, but if your Board authorized the modification, I think 
that is all that will be required." 
Mr. Tognazzini acknowledged the check and reported that 
the proposal had been accepted by the board of directors of 
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"In reply to yours of January 29th, I am pleased to ad-
vise that at the meeting of the Board of Directors yesterday 
afternoon the proposed modification of Oil Lease by and be-
tween Union Sugar Company and E. H. Moore, Inc., as con-
tained in my letter to you of the 16th and accepted by you 
in yours of January 29th, was ratified. 
"I am sure that Mr. Martin and I will be able to embody 
the principles agreed upon, to the satisfaction of all parties, 
and I shall do nothing further in this connection until I hear 
from Mr. Martin." _ ~ 
The trial court foUnd that "thereafter and as of the date 
of February I, 1940" defendant UNION SUGAR COHPANY and 
the said E. H. MooRE~'iN'm.~tered into a written agreement 
entitled 'Supplemental Contract'. . . ." The Pacific Coast 
Railway Corporation signed the "Supplemental Contract," 
thus making it a binding modification of the original lease. 
Considering the correspondence quoted above and the spe-
cific findings of the trial court with reference to the negoti-
ations, the conclusion is inescapable that, except for the 
provision in regard to o~set wells, the parties intended to 
~lieve the lessee of the obligation to drill more than three 
wells a year after the expiration of the two-year period of 
suspension of drilling. These letters and findings show that 
the lessee wanted a two-year suspension of all drilling be-
cause he was contemplating the building of a refinery and 
that the defendant was willing to agree to this suspension 
because there was little likelihood that the lessee would be 
obligated under the lease to drill during that period in any 
event. The lessee also desired a modification of the drilling 
requirements of clause 7, subject to limitations, based on 
market conditions and the price of oil. On the other hand, 
the lessor wanted an assurance of annual income from the 
lease and insisted that Moore, after the end of the two-year 
sUspension, be required to drill three wells a year regardless 
of market conditions and the price of oil. The parties 1inal1y 
agreed to terms suggested by defendant's president, which 
were proposed as a concession to the lessee without any sub-
stantial benefit to the lessor except. for the advance royal-
ties. Given the explanation of these terms by defendant'. 
president, it is clear that the parties agreed that the lessee 
would be obligated to drill three wells a year regardless of 
the price of oil or other market conditions, and that this 
obligation was in lieu of the drilling requirements of para-
) 
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graph 7 of the original lease. In consideration for this co~~ 
cession, the lessee agreed to pay advance royalties and :t;. 
increase his drilling obligations in regard to offset wells. ..\ 
The trial court nevertheless concluded not only that th8 
parties did not intend to grant any concession to the lessee 
other than the two-year suspension, which the lessor's presi..; 
dent had virtually admitted to be an unnecessary provision, 
but that the lessee had agreed to assume drilling obligations 
in addition to those under paragraph 7 of the original lease" 
to pay advance royalties, and to increase his o\>ligations with 
respect to offset wells. 
It is contended that the trial court erroneously interprete 
the contract without regard to the extrinsic evidence. Th 
trial court found "That it is untrue that the claims of de-
fendant UNION SUGAR COMPANY have created an ambiguity 
or that any ambiguity is apparent upon the face of said Orig-
inal Lease as modified by said Supplemental Contract." U 
this "finding" was intended as a finding that extrinsic evi-
dence was inadmissible, it is of course an erroneous conclu-
sion of law. (Brant v. California Dairies, Inc., 4 Ca~.2d 128,', 
133 [48 P.2d 13]; Wachs v. Wachs, 11 Cal.2d 322, 325 [79 
P.2d 1085].) The trial court, however, admitted evidence 
with reference to the negotiations between the parties and 
made extensive findings thereon. It must therefore be as-
sumed that the finding merely means that the trial court 
concluded that the contract, considered with reference to the 
evidence of these negotiations, was none the less susceptible 
of only one interpretation, namely the interpretation relied 
on by defendant. (Eastman Oil etc. Corp. v. Lane-Wells Co., 
21 Cal.2d 872, 875 [136 P.2d 564].) The question remains, 
therefore, whether there was any evidence from which a rea-
sonable inference could be drawn to support this conclusion. 
(Eastman Oil Corp. v. Lane-WeUB Co., supra; Estate of Platt, 
21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131 P.2d 825] ; Estate of Rule, 25 Cal. 
2d 1, 10 [152 P.2d 1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319].) 
Defendant contends that the evidence with reference to 
the conference in San Francisco between Martin, as Moore's 
representative, and three directors of defendant corporation I 
is in confiict and that a reasonable inference can be drawn 
from the evidence in defendant's favor, supporting the con-
clusion that the contract means that the drilling requirements 
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Tognazzini testified that when Martin came to California 
after the submission of the plan outlined in the Twitchell 
letter of October 14th, 1939, the witness informed him that 
the proposal had been rejected by defendant's board of direc-
tors. The witness also testified that he stated at the conference 
that because of the price of oil, defendant, under the original 
lease, stood not to receive revenue for a great many years 
to come; that defendant was willing to agree to a two-year 
suspension of all drilling requirements; that "they were un-
der no obligation to drill anyway;" but that thereafter there 
should be a requirement that the lessee drill three wells a 
year when the price of oil was below 60 cents, as well as some 
provision for advance royalties. Tognazzini testified further 
that "Clause 7 [of the original lease] as such, or any other 
numerical paragraph was never mentioned" and that nothing 
was said at the conference as to what the drilling require-
ments would be after the two-year suspension whenever the 
price of oil should be above 60 cents; but on cross-examina- '----. 
tion, the witness admitted that Martin had stated that the ) 
drilling requirements under the original lease "were: bur-( 
densome and prohibitory" and that Martin "in subst{lnce /' 
. . . again submitted the proposition that had been turned 
down which called for the drilling of three wells at the expir-
ation of the two years if the price were sixty cents. . . ." 
According to the witness, the answer to this request was 
"that at the expiration of two years I would require that 
even though the price of oil be under sixty cents, there would 
have to be three wells drilled." 
The director who testified at the trial, Francis L. Cross, 
testified that at the conference ":Mr. Tognazzini and :Mr. Mar-
tin did all the talking, :Mr. Cooke and I merely sat in and lis-
tened to the conversation." His recollection of the discussion 
between Martin and Tognazzini was substantially the same 
as that of Tognazzini. This witness also testified that Martin 
brought up the question of a modification of the drilling re-
quirement after the end of the two-year suspension period 
in the form of the plan outlined in the Twitchell letter, but 
that "Mr. Tognazzini told him unequivocally that that was 
out." 
The deposition of the third director, F. O. Cooke, who did 
not testify at the trial, remains for consideration. He stated 
that paragraph 7 of the original lease was not mentioned at 
the conference; that Martin did not state that the lessee 
I 
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wanted, in addition to a two-year suspension, "a modification 
of the lease so that they would [thereafter] only be required 
to complete three wells a year." When asked on cross-exami-
nation whether Martin suggested a modification along the 
lines of the Twitchell plan, Cooke stated that "1 don't recol· 
lect. I think I will stand on that." 
The foregoing evidence shows that there is support either ! 
for the conclusion that the question of modification of the 
drilling requirements after a two-year suspension of drilling 
was . not raised at the San Francisco conference or for the 
conclusion that Martin suggested at the 'conference that the 
original lease should be modified along the lines outlined in 
the previous tentative understanding between Martin and 
Twitchell and that this suggestion was rejected. 
In any event the points to be covered in a supplemental 
agreement were not decided npon in San Francisco. The 
negotiation continued by letters thereafter, and those letters 
comprehensively cover all the points finally agreed upon by 
the parties. The evidence is without conflict that the parties 
were unable to agree on the question of drilling requirements 
until some time after the San Francisco meeting. 
The Twitchell plan should not be confused with the modi. 
fication of drilling requirements proposed by Tognazzini in 
his letters of January 16, 1940, and January 25, 1940, ac· 
cepted by Moore in his letter of January 29, 1940. The 
Twitchell plan reduced the drilling requirements to three 
wells a year when the price of oil was over 60 cents a barrel 
and suspended all drilling requirements except with respect 
to otIset wells when the price of oil was below 60 cents a bar· ' 
rel and when other market conditions prevailed. This is the 
plan rejected by defendant. The counter proposal by Tog· 
'nazzini was essentially different from the Twitchell plan in 
that Moore's drilling obligation (except for o1Iset wells) was 
reduced to the drilling of three wells a year after two years 
·and Moore was to drill these three wells regardless of the price 
of oil and other market conditions. This plan was not im· 
mediately accepted by Moore, for he wanted more concessions. ; 
(Moore's letter of January 25, 1940.) The concessions were I 
refused, and in his letter of January 25, 1940, Tognazzini 
repeated the offer of January 16, 1940. This offer was ac- . 
eepted by Moore in his letter of January 29, 1940. 
[Sa] Defendant contends that a general finding that all . 
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untrue, is in effect a finding that at the San Francisco con- . 
ference modification of the drilling requirements of the lease 
after a two-year suspension was not discussed because plain-
tiff alleged that it was discussed. Defendant cannot rely on 
the specific findings of the trial court with reference to this 
conference, however, for there is nothing in those findings 
to indicate that the parties agreed that clause 7 was not to 
be modified, and nothing therein from which a reasonable 
inference could be drawn in conflict with the letters. The 
evidence as to what occurred at the San Francisco conference 
was in conflict, and the findings may be construed to the ef-
fect that there was no discussion at that time of any modifica-
tion of the drilling requirements of the lease after a two-year 
suspension. It does not follow, however, that it is reasonable 
to draw an inference that the modification of the drilling 
requirements was never discussed by the parties or their 
representatives. The evidence is without dispute that the 
modification of the lease was discussed by Martin and Twitch-
ell before the conference, but that the plan for a modification 
was rejected. The evidence is without dispute that on Mar-
tin's return to California to continue negotiations, he was 
informed by Tognazzini before the conference in question 
that this plan was rejected. A few days after the conference, 
he wrote a letter again proposing a modification of para-
graph 7. The proposal was again rejected, but the modifi-
cation of the drilling requirements of paragraph 7 was con-
sidered in virtually every letter between the representatives 
of the parties. All this evidence is without conflict. 
Only if the letters are disregarded could an inference be 
drawn from the testimony with respect to the San Francisco 
conference, that the parties never considered the modification 
of paragraph 7 and consequently did not intend clause 2 of 
the supplemental contract to be the measure of the lessee'8 
drilling obligations. The letters cannot be disregarded, for 
the trial court found that they were mailed and received. 
[4] There is no authority for the proposition that such an 
inference must be drawn to sustain the judgment. The de-
fendant relies on the majority opinion in Estate of Rule, 25 
Ca1.2d 1, 10-11 [152 P.2d 1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319], but that 
case is not authority for such a conclusion. The doctrine of 
the Rule case is that, "in tke absence of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, every intendment is in favor of the judg-
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fact or inference essential to the support of the order an 
warranted by the evidence was found by the court. . . . The 
rule is that an 'appellate court will accept or adhere to the 
interpretation [of a contract] adopted by the trial court-and 
not substitute another of its own-. . . where parol evidence: 
was introduced in aid of its interpretation, and such evidence 
• . . is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn ther 
from.''' (Italics added.) It is clear that this doctrine .1i 
inapplicable to the present case, for the trial court made ex; 
tensive findings and conclusions of law with respect to th~ 
negotiations, including the letters and the interlening con-, 
ference, and it cannot be assumed that the letters were nof 
considered, for they were virtually incorporated into the find-; 
ings. To apply the doctrine of the Rule case it would be~' 
necessary to infer that because there was no discussion of the,: 
modification at the San Francisco conference such a modifica-. 
tion was never considered by the parties, and then to infer:< 
further that the parties did not intend such a modification. ' 
lab] Since the letters, which show that the parties consid.,' 
ered such a modification, were found by the trial court to be' 
mailed and received, the evidence is not reasonably suscepti-: 
ble of an inference that would support the judgment. (See 
Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131 P.2d 825] ; Eastman 
Oil etc. Corp. v. Lane-WeUs Co., 21 Cal.2d 872, 875 [136 P.2d 
564].) 
[6] The defendant also contends that the judgment of 
the trial court is supported by the rule of construction em-
bodied in Civil Code, section 1654 that "In cases of uncer-' 
'tainty not removed by the preceding rules [including section, 
1647 that a contract may be explained by reference to the; 
circumstances under which it was made]. the language of a ; 
eontract should be interpreted most strongly against the I 
party who caused the uncertainty to exist. The promisor is '\ 
presumed to be such party. . . ." This rule on its face can-
Dot support the judgment in the present case. Clearly it \ 
cannot be applied against the lessee as the promisor, for a! 
llesic issue in the case is who was the promisor. Nor can it be 
aid that the lessee caused the uncertainty to exist, for the 
evidence is without conflict that the precise modification was 
suggested by defendant's president in language that was 
eopied almost verbatim into the formal document.s 
-It haa been 8uggested that thia modification was proposed b, Martin 
ill a letter clated J811uar.r 11, 1940. AD esamination of that letter, how-
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Defendant also contends that a reasonable inference might 
bc drawn in support of the trial court's conclusion from the 
fact that the formal document was drawn up by Moore's at-
torney. The basis for this contention seems to be that Mar-
tin as a competent attorney should have known that the lease 
would be interpreted in favor of defendant, and that, there-
fore, unless he intended that interpretation, he would have 
inserted certain words that would have removed any uncer-
tainty. Such an inference, however, assumes that Martin was 
aware of the ambiguity. The provision in question was taken 
from Tognazzini's letter of January 16th. That letter seems 
clear and unambiguous, and when considered in the context 
thereof, the provision itself likewise appears clear and un-
ambiguous. There is no reason to assume that Martin was 
any more aware of the possibility of this ambiguity than Tog-
nazzini, who suggested the modification and who signed the 
formal document without suggesting any changes in the dis-
puted provision. There is no reason to assume that Tognaz-
2ini is any less competent than Martin, and it is difficult to 
comprehend why he did not insert into his proposal or into 
the formal document the words that defendant now claims 
must be read into the instrument. It certainly is not reason-
able to· support the judgment of the trial court on the basis 
of some appraisal of the relative competence of these two men. 
The determination of the trial court that the lease as modi-
fied is capable of only one construction and that the parties 
intended that the drilling requirement of paragraph 7 would 
not be modified by clause 2 of the "Supplemental Contract" 
are without support in the evidence or any reasonable infer-
ence from the evidence. The specific findings as to the nego-
tiations, and the evidence, which is without conflict in any 
essential element and not reasonably susceptible of conflicting 
inferences, show clearly that the parties intended to modify 
paragraph 7 of the original lease. It follows that the trial 
court's construction of the lease is erroneous. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. In the briefs of the parties, the 
opinion of the District Court of Appeal (173 P.2d 700) 
~d the majority opinion of this court, we find an aggre-
ever, Bee footnote 2, 81Ipra, reveals that the modification there suggested, 
based on the price of oil and other JIllIrket toDditions, was clearly not 
the modi1ieatioD incorporated into the "Sullplemental Contract." 
) 
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gate of hundreds of pages of legal discussion. And, unfortu· 
nately, all of it together is of little benefit to the parties 0' 
to the law because in the final analysis the sole determinative 
question, in the view of the majority of this court, at least~ 
relates only to sufficiency of the evidence to support findingS; 
of the trial court and its construction of a written agreement., 
Apologetically I add to the fruitless discussion, impeUe 
thereto by the unrelenting conviction that the loser in any 
lawsuit on appeal is entitled to an adequate and fair factual 
statement by the reviewing court and to a decision which 
reckons with the record as it is. '.:t 
Reading of the entire record convinces me that in reality; 
the majority of this court reach their result not becauseJ 
the evidence as a matter of law is insufficient to sustain an/:, 
essential finding of fact or the trial court's construction 0(1 
the agreement but because, after weighing the sharply and' 
substantially conflicting evidence, they have concluded that,( 
as they view it, the greater weight of the evidence favors 
plaintiff and, hence, that the justice of the cause demands a 
reversal of the judgment. I am unable to concur in a judg·' 
ment of reversal which on any fair statement of the evidence~ 
call be supported on no other theory. j 
The facts essential to an adequate understanding of the' 
controversy are few and simple. The plaintiff oil company: 
is lessee by assignment under an oil lease executed by defend~ 
ant owner·lessor; the lease was modified and augmenteJ by' 
a supplemental agreement affecting the drilling obligations 
of the lessee; a dispute subsequently arose as to whether the 
provisions of the original lease relative to the number of 
strings of drilling tools to be operated continuously were 
abrogated and replaced by a provision of the supplemental 
agreement relative to a minimum number of wells to be COfn. 
pleted each year. To determine that dispute this action for 
declaratory relief was brought. 
Since, as above indicated, the issues in this case are either 
actually factual or are made so by the majority opinion, it 
becomes important at once to recognize what those issues are, 
what the evidence is, and, in particular, to set out in haec 
verba the language which the parties used and which is the 
subject of construction. 
Plaintiff in its petition for hearing declares that •• The heart 
of the controversy is the clause of the original lease fixing 
the lessee's drilling obligations after the discovery of oil and 
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the total number of wells that the lessee was to driB-one 
well to each ten acres [of a 6700 acre leasel-and (2) the 
rate at which the lessee was to drill this number, ..:lamely: 
'Lessee agrees to continuously operate one string of tools 
with due diligence for the first year after such discovery, 
two strings of tools for the second year after such discov-
ery, three strings of tools for the third year after such 
discovery, four strings of tools for the fourth year after 
such discovery, and five strings of tools thereafter until the 
drilling requirements herein specified are complied with.' " 
The foregoing requirement for operating, progressively, one 
to five strings of tools II imposed on the lessee the burden of 
spending from $180,000 the first year to $900,000 in the fifth 
and each subsequent year." The lease, as previously indi-
cated, covers some 6,700 acres of land and, hence, nnless 
surrendered in whole or in part, will entail the drilling of 
some 670 wells plus, possibly, conditionally required offset 
wells. Such original lease does not appear on its face to be 
unfair in any respect; it sets up various reciprocal rights and 
obligations in considerable detail; the drilling schedule above 
quoted is not an absolute obligation of the lessee; it can be 
relieved therefrom at any time by surrendering the lease and 
its rights thereunder; there is provision also for temporary 
suspension of its drilling obligations under certain specified 
conditions. 
The actual nub of this controversy lies in the present les-
see's claim that the "Supplemental Contract" eliminates com-
pletely and permanently the above quoted original contract 
provisions relative to the number of strings of tools to be 
operated in developing the property. The language of the 
"Supplemental Contract" so relied upon by the plaintUI-
lessee, and now by the majority of the court, is as follows: 
"It is agreed between Union Sugar Company . . . and E. H. 
Moore, Inc., . . . that oil and gas lease dated April 8, 1936, 
from Union Sugar Company, lessor, to Sovereign Oil Corpo-
ration, lessee . . . be, and same is hereby, modified in the 
following respects, to-wit: 
" (1) All obligations to drill additional wells, except off-
set wells, are hereby suspended for a period of two years from 
February 1, 1940. 
"(2) At the expiration of said two year period, Moore 
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"(3) Numerical Paragraph Nine (9) of the lease [relat-
ing to offset wells] of April 8, 1936, shall be modified by 
striking out '250 feet' wherever the same appears therein, 
and inserting in lieu thereof' 330 feet.' 
"(4) Commencing from the date of this supplemental 
contract, Moore agrees to pay a minimum royalty of $25,000.00 
per year, payable monthly in advance, and said royalty shall 
be charged against the total oil reserves during the course! 
of the life of the lease j that is to say, Moore shall be entitled 
to all oil and/or gas produced from said lease, or the prol!eeds 
thereof, until it is fully reimbursed from lessors' one-eighth 
royalty interest for the minimum royalty so paid. 
" (5) Except insofar as the provisions of the lease of 
April 8, 1936, are in conflict herewith, the same shall remain 
in full force and effect." 
Particularly is it to be neted that the above-quoted supple-
mental agreement is utterly silent as to the number of strings 
of tools to be operated after the drilling holiday. It provides 
that "(1) All obligations to drill additional wells, except 
offset wells, are hereby suspended for a period of two year, 
from February 1, 1940." (Italics added.) The holiday, ac-
cording to its terms, is a temporary suspension or morato-
rium, not an abrogation for the entire remaining term of the 
lease. But the effect of the majority holding is not to enforce 
any two-year suspension of the terms of the original lease; 
it is rather to permanently abrogate, insofar as the terms of 
the original lease are concerned, "All obligations to drill ad-
ditional wells, except offset wells" j that is to say, by the ma-
jority holding the drilling obligations (other than for offset 
wells) declared in the original lease are completely elimi-
nated and the only drilling obligation· (except for offset wells) 
now operative is that stated in the "Supplemental Contract," 
which is to II compZete three wells per year." (Whether in 
the view of the majority any offset wells completed during 
a year should be credited on the "complete-three-wells" pro-
gram does not clearly appear.) The supplemental agreement 
language is: "(2) At the expiration of said two year period, 
:Moore shall be obligated to complete three wells per year." 
(Italics added.) This language, viewed in its context, would 
leem to me to mean that "at the expiration" of the two-year 
.uspension of "All obligations to drill additional wells, ex-
eept offset wells," the lessee was to be obligated, regardless 
of the price of oil, of the number of strings of tools otherwise 
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chal'acter of formation encountered, or, etc., to, at the least, 
"complete three wells per year." (The same paragraph of 
the lease (No.7) which provides for the number of strings 
of tools to be continuously operated after discovery of oil 
also provides that "The Lessee shall be entitled to drill as 
many additional wells on said land and premises as it de-
sires. ") 
Certainly it cannot successfully be contended that the lan-
guage of the supplemental contract precludes the meaning 
above suggested. If that meaning is not precluded by such 
language we are bound to accept it for it was found by the 
trial court to be the true meaning of the language and the 
true agreement of the parties and such finding is amply sup-
ported by both direct and circumstantial evidence. As re-
counted hereinafter in more detail the record shows that Mr. 
Cooke, a director of defendant-lessor who participated in the 
negotiations leading up to the modification agreement, testi-
fied in respect to the terms agreed upon that "if we were 
going to give them a release on drilling of wells for two years 
... that they had to start and drill at least-l want to make 
particular emphasis on that word 'at least'~three wells a 
year .... [AnuJ if the price of oil was more than 60 cents 
... we expected them to go ahead on the original lease, unde,. 
that Clause Seven. . . . [Italics added.] [T]hree wells were 
to be drilled [per year] . . . Regardless of whether the price 
of oil was 60 cents or less." Likewise, as hereinafter shown 
in more particularity, the witness Cross testified as to the 
terms of modification agreed upon that "if they were given 
a two year suspension, would have to agree to drill and com-
plete at least three wells per year if the price of oil was under 
sixty cents. . . . There was absolutely no discussion of Para-
graph seven of the lease .... " Any failure to discuss para-
graph 7 at this time would seem to me to indicate that the 
repeated earlier refusals of defendant's directors to modify 
the drilling covenants beyond the two-year moratorium were 
accepted by Mr. Martin as final; and insofar as Martin may 
haYe again attempted to bring the subject up the positive 
refusal by defendant's directors to give it further considera-
tion (as suggested by evidence hereinafter quoted) is like-
wise suggestive that the supplemental agreement means what 
it says rather than what the majority now interpolate into it. 
I look in vain to the supplemental agreement for a provi-
sion saying that "the suspension of-' All obligations to drill 
/ 
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additional wells, except offset wells' is hereby made perma-,:, 
nent"; or that "the provisions of the original lease requir"~ 
ing the continuous operation with due diligence of five strings ,. 
of tools 'until the drilling requirements herein specified [one 
well to each 10 acres] are complied with,''' are suspended 
and inoperative not only for two years but for the entire 
remainder of the term of the lease. I look in vain for the' 
above but I find, "(5) Except insofar as the provisions of the ' 
lease of April 8, 1936, are in conflict herewith, the same shall ~ 
remain in full force and effect." .1 
It is obvious from an inspection of the original lease and .1. 
of the supplemental agreement that the latter on its face, ! 
construed as it must be with the document which it avowedly . 
supplements, does not purport to support the theory of, or 
the result reached in, the majority opinion; it does not ap~ 
pear to be ambiguous or uncertain or to admit of the con-
struction or effect now urged by plaintiff; on its face it does 
appear to fully sustain the construction given it by the trial 
court. Nevertheless, says plaintiff, if the extrinsic evidence 
is considered,I the only reasonable conclusion which can be 
drawn from it is that the parties to the lease really agreed to 
modify and supplement it in one element at least which is 
drastically different from anything which the language used 
aeems calculated to delineate. In fact, the plaintiff urges, and 
the majority opinion now argues, that the major object which 
the plainti1P sought to obtain in consenting to any change 
in the original lease was a permanent release, rather than a 
fwo-yea,. suspension, of its drilling obligations as provided 
hi. the original lease. The vast difference between a two-year 
auspension of the agreed drilling obligations and complete 
nlease therefrom with substitution of a mere three-well yearly 
completion schedule will at once be apparent to anyone who 
lias any intimate acquaintance. with the oil production busi-
BeSS and who pauses to consider the facts of this case. 
Bere we have a 6,700 acre lease with the lessee obligated, 
.,. the terms of the lease as originally executed, to develop 
tlle land with reasonable expedition by continuous operation 
.turing the fifth and subsequent years after discovery of oil 
lFor the purposes of this dissent the admissibility of such extrinsic 
eridenee is a88umed but this does not imply accord with the holding 
tlat it was properly admitted. 
IThe word plaintiff is used herein interchangeably as denoting either 
fie present plaintiff or its predece880r in interest under the leaae from 
Wendant. 
.... 
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or gas in paying quantities, of five strings of tools "with due 
diligence." How many wells might be completed each year 
by the operation of five strings of tools 'is, of course, a vari-
able. Whether one hole Can be completed in three weeks, 
three months or three years depends not only on the diligence 
and skill of the workers but also on the type of equipment 
used, the character of the geological formations encountered 
and the depth of the oil sand from which production, if any, 
eventually is obtained. There is evidence here that the opera-
tion of five strings might produce as many as 15 wells a year; 
it could, of course, complete less than three. At 15 wells a 
year to fully develop the lease (without allowance for unusual 
delays) would require approximately 45 years. If plaintiff 
prevails and can maintain the lease by completing only three 
wells a year-if that is tantamount to saying it need drill 
only three holes a year-it will require 223 years to put de-
fendant's land on full production! With such a seemingly 
absurd result, from defendant's standpoint, to be made possi-
ble from the interpretation urged by plaintiff, and with that 
interpretation to be read into language which does not, by 
itself, even remotely suggest it, one should expect that the 
eyidence requiring such ,a construction (if, indeed, there be 
any known theory of law which permits it) must indeed be 
overwhelming and without conflict. But in truth the most 
that can be said for plaintiff is that the evidence is in sharp 
conflict. 
The majority opinion on its very ,face recites evidence 
which, if fairly analyzed, according to all heretofore accepted 
standards would require that the findings of the trial court 
and its construction of the contracts be sustained. Such dis-
cussion of the evidence as appears in the majority opinion, 
insofar as it is objective, is obviously argumentative as to the 
differing inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. 
In other words the thesis of the majority opinion constitutes 
a mere argument on the weight of the evidence, the resolu-
tion of its conflicts, and the selection of inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, matters which are no concern of a reviewing court. 
But my greatest quarrel with the majority opinion comes not 
from evidence which it discusses but, rather, from evidence 
which it leaves unquoted. 
The record discloses that at the time of the negotiations 
for the modifications to the lease the following circumstances 
existed: The then lessee, E. H. Moore, Incorporated, a one-
/ 
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man corporation, was dissatisfied with marketing conditions 
at the defendant '8 field. Moore was dissatisfied largely be-
cause the present lessee (plaintiff here) was the only crude 
oil purchaser available and, as such, had fixed an arbitrarily 
low price which Moore had no alternative but to accept if 
he was to produce and market oil in that field. By way 
of remedying that situation Moore conceived the plan of 
building a refinery at the field so that he could handle his 
own production. According to the record a two-year mora-
torium or "holiday" in drilling requirements would enable 
him to devote toward the building of a 'refinery some 
$1,800,000 in cash which otherwise might have to be expended 
in drilling new wells. Although at that time the oil com-
pany was offering less than 60 cents a barrel for the oil being 
produced by Moore from defendant's field, and although 
the obligation of the lessee to operate the five strings of 
tools was suspended while the price was below 60 cents, 
there was, of course, nothing to prevent the oil company 
from raising the price to 60 cents or more at any time it 
saw fit so to do. To the end of securing some modification 
in the drilling program-at least security against having to 
drill any but offset wells for a two-year period during which 
a refinery might be built-Moore commenced negotiations 
with representatives of defendant. In most of these negotia-
tions Moore was represented by Mr. Villard Martin, an 
attorney at law. In the initial negotiations Mr. Martin 
broached the matter to Mr. Edmunds Lyman, who was then 
president of the defendant lessor; Mr. Lyman referred Mr. 
Martin to Mr. T. A. Twitchell, an attorney at law; Mr. Mar-
tin thereupon conferred with Mr. Twitchell and stated the 
desires of the Moore Company; Mr. Twitchell then prepared 
a memorandum of the proposition suggested by Martin and 
forwarded it to the offices of the lessor at San Francisco. 
This proposition is sometimes referred to in the record and 
herein as the "Twitchell deal" or proposal, and because of 
the repeated references to it by some of the witnesses at 
the trial its _ substance is of importance to bear in mind in 
any appraisal of the sufficiency or weight of the evidence 
relative to supporting or failing to support the judgment. 
Mr. Twitchell, in his report to the lessor (under date of 
October 14, 1939, received in evidence as plaintiff's Exhibit 
No.5), said: "Mr. Villard Martin, attorney for Mr. Moore, 
was here Thursday discussing the possibility of modifying 
-
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the oil and gas lease between the company as lessor, and Mr. 
Moore as lessee. Mr. Moore desires to construct a topping 
plant to handle the oj} from the lease, but does not desire 
to spend the money required to build this plant if he has 
to comply with the existing drilling requirements of the 
lease. If Moore constructs a topping plant it will be to the 
advantage of the Union Sugar Company because it will create 
an outlet for oil, and this in turn will mean immediate reve· 
nue for the company as lessor .... 
"I informed Mr. Martin that I would submit the proposal 
to you, and that you in turn would submit it to the Board 
of Directors. 
"Mr. Martin originally proposed to modify the drilling 
requirements so that Mr. Moore would only be required to 
develop the lease in accordance with good oil field practice. 
Many. old oil leases did not contain any express drilling re-
quirements, and in those leases the Courts uniformly held 
that there was an implied obligation to drill when conditions 
warranted further drilling. . . . 
"I informed Mr. Martin that I could not recommend that 
the lease be modified in this way. After discussion, we ar-
rived at the following tentative plan: 
"I. . The Union Sugar Company shall agree to suspend 
all drilling obligations for a period of two years, except the 
obligation to drill offset wells. . . . 
"2. The existing proven area, comprising some 400 acres, 
would be zoned and in that zone, after two years, Moore 
would be required to drill 3 wells per year, provided that 
the price of oil is 60c or more per barrel at the well. . . . 
"The provision calling for three wells per year was in-
serted because three wells per year would be all that Moore 
would be required to drill, assuming that he was operating 
with one string of tools. Martin said he might desire to drill 
three wells all at one time under contract, rather than to 
allow 90 days to elapse between wells, as provided in the lease. 
"3. Moore would not be obligated to drill any additional 
wells . . . outside of the proven area, unless oil should be 
discovered on the property or or adjacent property at such 
locations that it would appear probable that oil could be dis-
covered and produced from a portion of the unproven area ...• 
"I also believe that it would be advisable to provide that 
the agreement would be null and void if Moore assigned or 
transferred the lease to some third person. • •.• " 
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It is obvious from mere perusal of the above-quoted re-
port that even the "Twitchell deal," although it definitely 
called for a modification of the five-strings-of-tools develop-
ment program, certainly contemplated more extensive drilling 
obligations than the three-wells-a-year now held by the major-
ity to have been agreed upon. But as will appear from evi-
dence hereinafter quoted the "Twitchell deal" was rejected 
by the defendant's directors because they would not grant 
such an extensive release from the drilling obligations de-
clared in the original lease. Following the Twitchell report 
Mr. Lyman was succeeded by Mr. Tognazzini as president of. 
the Union Sugar Company, and Mr. Martin arranged for a 
conference directly with Mr. Tognazzini. The latter called 
in Mr. Cooke and Mr. Cross, directors of the defendant com-
pany, and the conference was held at the Stock Exchange 
Club in San Francisco, on December 20, 1939. 
According to Mr. Tognazzini's testimony Mr. Martin 
~'asked me about the modification, what action had been 
taken on the proposal that had been submitted to us by Mr. 
Twitchell .... And I told him that the proposition had been 
turned down cold by the Board of Directors .... Mr. Martin I 
opened up the subject again about a modification and he 
elaborated at length on the large amount of money that had 
been expended by E. H. Moore, Incorporated, and the dif-
ficulties that they had encountered in disposing of the oil, 
stating that the arrangements as they existed in the Santa 
Maria Field by virtue of the only outlet being that of the 
Union Oil Company, had made it unsatisfactory .... He 
stated that they needed to obtain an outlet and one method 
would be to establish a refinery or some similar institution 
of their own; that they had gone to the expense of discussing 
the same with a firm of engineers in Los Angeles; that they 
were prepared to go ahead with that, but in view of the 
large sum of money that would have to be expended for the 
erection of a refinery, and that he thought there was a pos-
sibility of the price of oil going up again, that he wished 
to have the lease modified so that there would be a complete 
IAlSpension of drilling operations for two years. . . . I told 
JUm that most of the leases in the Santa Maria Valley Field 
were more favorable to the lessor than that which the Union 
Sugar Company had ...• I told him further, as I recall, that 
die Union Oil Company controlled that field, that I was in-
ttignant over the attitude of the Union Oil Company who 
/ 
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had had a posted price of seventy cents in that field; . . • 
that any analysis disclosed that there were twenty-three or 
twenty-four oil fields throughout the State of California 
the price on which oil of comparable gravity was within a 
few cents of this seventy cent range ; that the Union Oil 
Company, for reasons best known to themselves, arbitrarily 
reduced the price of oil in this particular field which they 
controlled to below fifty cents; that in no other field in the 
State of California would you find a comparable reduction 
or price for comparable oil. . . . I told him further that he 
might be of the opinion that the price of oil would go up, 
which would necessitate a resumption of drilling, but I was 
going to protect the interests of the Union Sugar Company 
in the event the price of oil did not go up. So I made it 
very clear to him that 80 far as we were concerned, we would 
permit, if all parties could agree upon the terms. and condi-
tions of this two year suspension. They were under no obli-
gation to drill anyway. It was only on a basis of an antici-
pated increase in the price of oil that they might have to drill 
at this particular stage of the game. I told him that in the 
event we could agree that there must be a prOvision whereby 
there would be the drilling of three wells per year when the 
price of· oil was below sixty cents. We did not arrive at that 
particular meeting at the monetary consideration to be paid 
to us. I advanced the theory that there was proven produc-
tion and whatever monetary consideration would be given 
to us was really not a consideration for the reason that it 
would be only an advance of money to us on our own pro-
duction or proven oil reserves to be charged against those 
reserves as time went on. That statement came about in 
answer to this unit plan or some such plan that had been 
discussed in the Twitchell letter and again had been dis-
cussed almost verbatim at this meeting .••. " 
The witness continued, •• Since Twitchell's letter is in the 
testimony, I guess we can refer to it. In the Twitchell let-
ter there was a statement made that they be permitted, or 
that there be a suspension of drilling requirements for two 
years and at the expiration of that time, if the price of oil 
be sixty cents or more, that three wells be drilled . 
•• Q. Yes' A. At this meeting I took just the opposite posi-
tion because we turned down that proposition cold, that at the 
expiration of two years three wells must be completed if the 
price of oil be below sixty cents. That'l all we were talking 
I 
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about. That's all that I was talking about, and that there ~ 
this minimum revenue coming in, not only during the two 
years which was a condition for the suspension for a two year 
period in order to give relief in the event the price of oil 
went up, in view of the contemplated erection of a refineri, 
that at the expiration of that two year period if the price 
of oil still be below sixty cents, then I wanted three wella 
to be drilled on that property per year. . . . ~~ 
" Q. Was anything said during that discussion as to 
what drilling requirements would be if the price of oil waS 
above sixty cents after the expiration of the two year period t; 
A. No, nothing whatsoever. We had turned down the prop-, 
osition that there be three wells drilled if the price were 
over sixty cents. The lease provisions prevailed if the price 
were over sixty cents. What was being asked was a respite; 
for two years because of the fear that the price of oil was',. 
going to go up again which then would require the drilling; 
and producing of that field. Now that's what the whole' 
discussion was about at this particular meeting and the i 
proposition was made, or the play on our sympathies was: 
made, showing how much money had been expended, how: 
they were unable to have an outlet because of the activities 
of the Union Oil Company in that particular field and how. 
therefore it was necessary for them to erect a refinery in. 
order to obtain an outlet of their own. And while they were' 
erecting all that, going to all that further expense, Mr. Mar- . 
tin stated definitely he anticipated an increase in the price 
of oil. In that respect he was correct, because there was an , 
increase in the early part of 1941. I 
"Q. Did they, as a matter of fact, erect a refinery f A. 
No." 
In corroboration of the testimony of Mr. Tognazzini we 
find the testimony of Mr. Cooke: 
"As I say, we were gathered downstairs, and Mr. Martin 
said he had come here at the instance of Mr. Moore to see 
if something could not be done to help out the situation, 
which was getting rather critical at that time. 
"Q. Did he explain in what respect the situation was 
getting critical, do you recall T A. Yes, the oil situation had 
changed there and he found he needed relief, one way or an-
other; had to have relief from drilling some oil wells he should 
have to drill under his contract, and he stressed quite a point 
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change in that, and that he would probably have to put in 
a refinery. That was the thing that struck me. There were 
two or three things Martin had on his mind. One was, he 
figured, he tried to get it over to all of us, that Mr. Moore 
would have to spend a lot of money for this refinery, and if 
he did that he felt he should have some relief on the drilling 
of the wells. 
"Q. Did he explain why he thought he would have to 
have a refinery! A. Yes, there was no way of getting his 
oil out at that time; the marketing conditions bothered him. 
Mr. Tognazzini did most of the talking to him at that time. 
We really sat back and listened, except whfon it got near the 
end we went in on a few things, made some_~ugg(t~ons and 
, I "-
worked them out, and as far as I remember~o you want 
me to try and dig up some of the statements f 
"MR. BRANDT: As far as the sum and substancl of it 
goes. A. (Continuing:) The sum and substance was: You 
must realize we had had nothing under this oil business, and 
we felt that we should have an adjustment made there that 
was fair to us and fair to the Moore people. If I remember 
rightly, they started to and drilled approximately, when they 
asked for this meeting, I think it was twelve wells, and out 
of these 12 wells, I think 10 were operating and 2 were dry, 
or not in good condition. I don't know the technical condi-
tion, but they were not on production, let's say that, and he, 
Mr. Martin, seemed to feel that we should give them this 
2-year extension whereby they didn't drill any wells. They 
wanted relief. Well, we didn't give them any definite answer 
at that time, because there were other things he was going 
to bring up-Mr. Tognazzini was going to bring up-and 
that was the matter of us getting some money on a royalty 
basis. We felt we should have that, and also we felt if we 
were goiJ,lg to give them a release on drilling of wells for two 
years, that under no circumstances were we going to allow 
them at the end of that time not to live up to their agree-
ment, that they positively had to live up to their agreement, 
which was, in fact, that they had to start and drill at least-
I want to make particular emphasis on that word 'at least'-
three wells a year. 
"Q. At the end of the two years! A. At the end of the 
two years .... 
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the extent of the acreage leased' A. Yes, I think he men-
tioned that we had leased Mr. :Moore some 6700 acres. 
cCQ. That they were included in the lease' A. Included 
in the lease. 
"Q. Do you recall whether anything was said concern-' 
ing the then price of oil' A. He was very insistent on ' 
that point, because, as I remember, he made the stateDl:ent' 
that no matter what the price of oil was, that the :Moore , 
Company were still obligated to drill three wells-at least) 
three wells-a year, irrespective of the price of oil .... 
"Q. And did :Mr. :Martin, as you recall, mention the pos-' 
&ibility that oil might increase in price while' building their 
refinery' A. Yes, he did. 
"Q. What did he say in that connection' A. He said 
that he would like to have two years and be released from 
that drilling, but he said the oil might go up-I don't think ' 
he said any particular price as to what the oil might go up 
to-but we came right back to the same thing, that irre- , 
spective of the price of oil we still say you will have to drill 
at least three wells a year. 
ceQ. Now, during the conversation was there anything 
that you recall, Mr. Cooke, mentioned concerning the num-
ber of drilling rigs at any time' A.' No, no. 
'c Q. Was there any mention that you can now recall con-' r 
eerning Paragraph Seven of the lease as such' A. I think ' 
that was a clause-Seven, was it' 
'c Q. Clause Seven' A. ClaUse Seven; no, no mention 
at all. 
" Q. Was there any discussion about the number of rigs 
that were to be used after the expiration of the 2-year period' 
A. No sir. 
"Q. Did Mr. :Martin state to you people, you directors' 
there and to Mr. TOgDszzini, that he wanted a suspension of 
drilling operations for two years, and on top of that wanted : 
• new agreement with respect to . future operations f ••• A. No.1 
ceQ. Did Mr.:Martin ask that in addition to suspension, 
that the lease be modified to reduce the number of strings , 
of tools required to be used or the number of wells to be 
c1ril1ed' A. No. , 
"Q. Did Mr. :Martin say at that time that it was his pur-. 
pose to secure a complete suspension for two years, and 
thereafter secure a modification of the lease, so that they 
would only be required to complete three wells a year' A. No. 
I 
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"Q. Did he say, did Mr. Martin say, he wanted to get 
the lease modified so that they would not be required to keep 
the number of strings of tools busy as provided in Para-
graph Seven of the lease' A. No." 
On cross-examination of Mr. Cooke by plaintiff's counsel, 
he was shown a copy of Mr. Martin's testimony as given in 
a deposition and an effort was made to break down his testi-
mony. The record reBects the following: 
"Q. I will again refer to Mr. Martin's deposition on 
page 70. Mr. Martin stated: 'I told them I was up there to 
get a modification of that lease. 
" 'Q. What kind of a modification did you tell them you 
were after' . 
" 'A. I told them I wanted to get that lease modified 80 
that we would not be required to keep the number of strings 
of tools busy that are provided for in Paragraph Seven of 
the lease.' 
" A. My answer to that is 'no.' 
"Q. That he didn't make that statemenU A. No, he did 
not make that statement .... 
"Q. And I will also ask you, then, if you recall, or if 
you are prepared to state, that he didn't state at. the confer-
ence as follows: . . . • The discussion there was that after the 
expiration of the 2-year period under this proposal that we 
made there and this supplemental agreement we had submit-
ted, we were going to have to drill three wells each year, 
regardless. 
"'Q. It was your proposition, then, to them that you 
have a limit as to the number of wells after the expiration 
of the two years" 
"THE WITNESS: No, no. 
"MR. POWELL: I am just reading, I have not come to the 
point as yet in the question asked Mr. Martin in his deposition. 
" 'A. That is right, three wells a year after the expiration 
of the two years was the limit of our drilling requirements.' 
"THE WITNESS: Ob no, no. 
"MR. POWELL: Q. You are prepared to say definitely' 
A. He is confused on that. 
"Q. Are you prepared to say that Mr. Martin did Dot 
make that statement' A. yes .... 
"Q. Then I will ask you, Mr. Cooke,- if at this conference 
Mr. Martin stated that the only change in the lease they 
.1 
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wanted was a suspension of two years in drilling' A. 
years' 
"Q. A two years' suspension in drilling obligations' 
thlnk that is correct, yes. 
H Q. He stated that was all that he was seekingt A.. 
that time, yes. 
"Q. A two years' suspension in drilling, nothing 
A. No .... 
, "Q. What was to happen if the price was more than 
cents' A. That wasn't referred to at all. We, expected 
to go ahead on the original lease, under thai Clause WA'W ......... 
that you speak of, but Moore never mentioned Clause 
"Q. You stated just now that three wells were to be 
regardless of the price of oil, I think that is your precise 
guage. Do you mean regardless of whether the price ,i 
less or more than 60 cents a barrel' A. Regardless of wheth~: 
the price of oil was 60 cents or less." , I,~ 
The foregoing quoted matters from the testimony of tli~e. 
witness Cooke are only a part, but a fairly illustrative part, 
of his positive and material testimony which the majoritY, 
opinion dismisses as insufficient to create a substantial con-
ilict in the evidence of surrounding circumstances from which, 
circumstances such opinion interprets the "Supplemental' 
Contract" to mean what the witness Martin asserts he asked', 
for but which the contract does not state and which the wit-
ness Cooke, as well as the witness Tognazzini, testified Martin 
in part did not ask for and in part asked for but was refused. 
And the gist of the testimony of the witnesses Tognazzini, 
and Cooke is corroborated by another witness, Mr. Francis L."; 
Cross, a member of the State Bar and a director of the de-' 
fendant-Iessor. Mr. Cross was among those present at the '\ 
San Francisco conference, which lasted "from around· noon, 
to three-thirty, a quarter to four, sometime there." The' 
transcript shows: "Q. Now can you give us, in substance, 
Mr. Cross, your recollection of that discussion' What did 0 
Mr. Martin, in substance say, and what did Mr. Tognazzini, l 
in substance say' 1 
"A.. Well sir, Mr. Martin discussed the question of the oil , 
lease he had with us and that at the time it was very onerous; ; 
that they had spent a substantial amount of money on this 
lease and they weren't very happy in that regard. That was 
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"Q. Did he say anything about a refinery t A. Yes, he 
spoke of building a refinery in rather positive terms, had 
an engineering architect .who was going ahead with this re-
finery. 
" Q. Yes, well, did he make any suggestions as to what he 
wanted t A. Mr. Martin spoke of these matters first and 
stated that they wanted a two year suspension of a drilling 
clause. 
" Q. Yes t A. They wanted relief for two years from hav-
ing to drill. That was the sum and substance of his entire 
conversation, the crux of it. 
"Q. What, if anything, did Mr. Tognazzini say' A. Well, 
Mr. Tognazzini did quite a bit of talking and. told Mr. Moore 
that he was new in the Union Sugar Company, which was 
a fact, and was looking after the interests of the Union Sugar 
Company and he went into great lengths to show what had 
happened in the Gato Ridge to his cousin, Lario Tognazzini, 
and he was not going to allow the Union Sugar Company to 
get in that same position; that he wanted some payment. No 
payment was mentioned,-no specific payment was mentioned 
but that he wanted some payment and that in any event the 
Oil Company, E. H. Moore, Inc., if they were given a two 
year suspension, would have to agree to drill and complete 
at least three wells per year if the price of oil was under sixty 
cents. 
I I Q. And was there any discussion as to what drilling 
'Would be required at the expiration of the two year period, 
during the period when the price was above sixty cents' 
A. There was absolutely no discussion of ·that at all. It 
wasn't mentioned. 
"Q. Was there any discussion that you recall concerning 
Paragraph Seven of the lease' A. There was absolutely no 
discussion of Paragraph Seven of the lease. 
" Q. Was there anything said that you recall at that con-
ference concerning the number of drilling rigs to be used' 
A.No, I don't recall any mention of any drilling rigs or 
anything like that. t t 
It is also significant to note that on cross-examination of 
Mr. Cross the following appears: "Now, Mr. Cross, I under-
stand from you that all Mr. Martin wanted was a two year 
Suspension in drilling; nothing else ~ 
/ ,. 
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"A. Mr. Martin talked about getting relief for two 
It is true that during this conversation he brought up 
Twitchell deal, that they had been trying to put through 
Twitchell. Mr. Tognazzini told him unequivocally that 
was out." The unequivocal refusal to consider "the 
deal" imports a refusal by defendant-lessor to consider 
three-well-a-year proposal as a substitute for the more S'PElCltic"1 
drilling operations provided for in the lease. 
Again on cross-examination Mr. Cross was asked, , 
did Mr. Martin ask for any reduction in the drilling 
ments at the expiration of the two yearsT" And he .. n,,,'W,~ .... tI 
.. No," with the explanation that "He . . . tried to bring 
[the Twitchell deal] up again, the deal that he wanted to 
put over with the Union Sugar Company that was turned 
down. He again brought that up and was again turned 
down .... " 
In what is essentially an argument directed at the 
of conflicting evidence Justice Traynor declares, .. Only if the 
letters are disregarded could an inference be drawn from: 
the testimony with respect to the San Francisco COIlfe:relllce. 
that the parties never considered the modification of para-
graph 7 and consequently did not intend clause 2 of the 
Supplemental Contract to be the measure of the lessee's 
ing obligations. The letters cannot be disregarded, for the 
trial court found that they were mailed and received. There 
is no authority for the proposition that such an inference, 
must be drawn to sustain the judgment." The above-quoted 
argument misses the point completely. The evidence in the 
record which I have above referred to and quoted in part 
was not relied on by the trial judge, as "support for an in-
·ference that the parties never considered such a modification." 
Exactly the contrary is true. The evidence is positive to the 
point that Mr. Martin, representing Mr. Moore, requested" 
"such a modification" originaUy and repeatedly and that. 
such request was rejected and refused by the directors of ' 
defendant corporation. Only in the sense that they absolutely 
refused such proposal by Mr. Martin did they decline to "con-
sider" it. They did so refuse to consider it, in that sense, and 
apparently they continued to so refuse down to and including , 
the time when the modification agreement was executed. 
The oral testimonies of the directors show the terms of the 
agreement which were discussed and tentatively accepted; 
such testimonies show what was refused and what was Dot 
) 
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refused; their version of the conference corresponds with the 
terms of the "Supplemental Contract" as it actually was 
finally drafted and executed, 1Iot as plaintiff would now have 
us "construe" or interpolate it. Obviously the inferences 
to be drawn from such evidence, within all reasonable limits, 
were for the trial court, not this court, to determine; and 
surely it is within reasonable limits to draw the inference that 
a proposed modification which was requested by Mr. Martin 
and absolutely and positively rejected and refused by the 
three directors of defendant corporation at the principal con-
ference held would not be gratuitously or otherwise revived 
and granted by those same directors when they came to 
actually authorizing the amending contract. And, further-
more, if Tognazzini, acting alone, did talk ahout the matter 
further, by letters or otherwise, it was for the trial judge to 
determine from all the evidence (if any was admissible under 
the circumstances) what terms were finally agreed upon. 
The contract is itself evidence of its terms and of what the 
parties intended; in its final form it was drafted by Martin; 
the language was in large part the same as he had previously 
proposed; language which he previously bad proposed to 
secure more extensive modifications, or an abrogation, of the 
drilling requirements of paragraph 7, significantly, was 
omitted from the final draft. The weight of the contract 
itself as evidence is completely ignored in the majority opin-
ion but its significance as evidence is corroborated by the testi-
monies of Cooke and Cross and Tognazzini and by circum-
stantial evidence. 
The fact that the court found that certain letters "were 
mailed and received" does not appear to me to add anything 
to the significance of those letters as evidence. Their weight 
or significance here depends not on the fact of their having 
been mailed and received but on what the trial court be-
lieved, and was supported by the evidence in believing, the 
writer of the letters and their recipient understood was being 
agreed upon by way of modification of or supplement to the 
original lease. Just why statements in letters by Mr. Tog-
nazzini should be overwhelming in weight while the oral 
testimonies of Mr. Tognazzini, Mr. Cooke and Mr. Cross as to 
what was tentatively agreed upon and what was' positively 
rejected should be entitled to no weight at all is beyond me. 
The fact is that the testimonies of Mr. Cross and Mr. Cooke 




338 UNION On.. CO. tI. UNION SUGAR Co. 
late court to affirm) the terms of the agreement as stated 
the language of the contract as executed and as found by 
trial court. The letters are not the contract which was 
cuted. They are in evidence, like the oral testimony, sinl'pl~;JI 
as parts of the surrounding circumstances. The letters tne'm~J. 
selves are not free from ambiguities and self-contained 
flicts. They are entitled to no greater weight than the 
judge, in the light of all the evidence including his view of 
parties, gave to them. Surely the formally executed 
supported by the oral testimonies of the several wi1Gne;sses, 
should be as competent evidence of what was meant by 
letters as the letters are of what was meant by the contract.' 
Surely, also, the persuasiveness of such evidence was a ques:., 
tion for the trial court, not for us. The oral testimony is en~' 
titled to just as much weight, as far as we are concerned, as the 
written letters. The ora] testimony strongly indicates that,' 
the true contract is that which was actually reduced to writing 
rather than that which is now by judicial fiat interpolated '. 
therein. 
A further example of weakness in the majority opinion is 
found in its effort to explain away application of section 1654 
of the Civil Code providing that" In cases of uncertainty not 
removed ~ the preceding rules [including section 1647 that -
a contract may be explained by reference to the circumstances 
under which it was made], the language of a contract should 
be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the 
uncertainty to exist. The promissor is presumed to be such 
party .... " After quoting the section as above, Justice Tray-
nor's opinion asserts that "This rule On its face cannot sup-
port the judgment in the present case. Clearly it cannot be 
applied against the lessee as the promissor, for a basic issue 
in the case is who was the promissor. Nor can it be said that 
the lessee caused the uncertainty to exist, for the evidence" 
without conflict that the precise modification was suggested 
by defendant'. president in language that was copied almost 
verbatim into the formal document." (Italics added.) It is 
true that the language" almost verbatim" is to be found fu the 
letter written by "defendant's president." But it requires 
very little more diligence in examining the record to ascertain 
that an earlier lIOurce of the same language is a letter written 
by plaintiff's lIr. Martin to defendant's Mr. Tognazzini. Mr. 
Martin there says: "Dear Mr. Tognazzini: Delay in writing 
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... I reported to him the substance of my conversation with 
you and Messrs. Cook and Cross, and he asked that I write 
you outlining briefly the terms of a supplemental contract 
along the line of my conversation with you. 
" We proposed to embody the following in said supplemental 
contract: . . . All obligations to drill additional wells, except 
offset wells, are hereby suspended for a period of two years 
from the date of this contract. 
"At the expiration of said two year period, Moore shall 
be obligated to drill three wells per year in any area consisting 
of approximately 400 acres, being that part of the leased 
premises which is considered proven territory ... except 
that Moore shall not be obligated to drill during the existence 
of either of [certain enumerated conditions]. . . . 
"There shall be no obligation to drill any additional wells 
on that part of the leased property outside of the proven 
area ... unless oil is discovered on said property .... 
"Except insofar as the provisions of the lease of April 8, 
1936, are in conflict herewith, the same shall remain in full 
force and effect." 
Mr. Tognazzini replied as follows: "In response to yours 
of the 11th, may I first advise that the terms and conditions 
contained therein are unsatisfactory. 
"It was my impression from past conversations you had 
with my predecessor, and more recently, with Messrs. Cooke, 
Cross, and me that it was the desire of E. H. Moore Inc. to 
obtain a modification of the present oil and gas lease existing 
between E. H. Moore Inc. and the Union Sugar Company. 
In this connection, I expressed to you at our recent meeting 
that Union Sugar Company was desirous of cooperating with 
E. H. Moore Inc., but only to the extent that both parties 
were to benefit mutually by said modification." It is only after 
the above-quoted introductory statements, and in the light 
of all the preceding negotiations of the parties, that Mr. 
Tognazzini went on to summarize what he understood to be 
Mr. Martin's "desire" and wnat he understood was the "de-
sire" of the defendant lessor, and after such statement of 
what obviously had been largely opposing "desires," he con-
cluded with the following suggestion: "Both you and I, in 
obtaining a modification, desire to reduce it to its simples 
[sic] form and to this extent I suggest the following, to-wit: 
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wells, except offset wells, for a period of two years from 
of the modification, 
"(2) The moiljfying of the paragraph 9, by striking 
250 feet and inserting in lieu thereof, 330 feet, and in 
tion thereto, appropriate language to provide that when 
wells are being produced within said range, more or 
E. H. Moore Inc. likewise produce, 
"(3) At. the expiration of the two year period, E. H. 
Inc. shall be obligated to drill three wells per year . 
• , The consideration for the above will be the paying 
minimum royalty of $25,000. per year, said royalty _. __ ... , ... 
monthly in advance." 
Regardless of who originated the form of language 
in the "Supplemental Contract" it was Mr. Martin, act:inirJ 
for the plaintiff's predecessor, who finally drafted the 
tract; and it was the same Mr. Martin, acting in the 
capacity, who was at all times the moving and pressing 
in seeking a lease modification. Concerning Mr. Martin, 
in the exercise of those fact finding prerogatives which 
properly a function of the trial court, rather than of 
court, the learned trial judge, in his memorandum , 
says: "As the Court has intimated, it is inconceivable to n~ 
that E. H. Moore's Inc. able and experienced counsel would' 
fail to provide, in plain and unambiguous terms, the present i 
contentions of the plaintiff herein, had they been those now; 
contended for." Certainly the quoted observation of the 
trial judge indicates not misconduct or error, as suggested by' 
the majority opinion, but, rather, an entirely proper appre- .. 
eiation of the significance of circumstantial as well as direct ... 
evidence. And, in truth, the letter from Mr. Tognazzini to : 
Mr. Martin, which Justice Traynor seizes upon as overwhelm- 1 
ing substantially all other evidence in the record, is but a 
part-a greater part or a lesser part, as various fact finders 
might respectively view it-of a record which discloses with 
absolute certainty, to a reviewing court, only one thing: a'· 
substautial conflict in the evidence. 
I have not herein, by any means, related every detail of 
~vidence, either direct or circumstantial, which supports the 
trial court's findings and construction but what has been set 
fortll above is ample, under any pertinent rules of law which 
ever Jaeretofore have been followed in this state, not only to 
support, but to demand that we sustain, the lower court ill 
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For adequate treatment of those of the points briefed which 
I have not found it necessary or desirable to discuss in a dis-
senting opinion reference is made to the opinion prepared by 
Mr. Justice Wilson for the District Court of Appeal, Second 
Appellate District, Division Two, reported in 173 P.2d 700. 
The judgment should be affirmed .. 
Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied February 
9, 1948. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a 
rehearing. 
